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ABSTRACT:  In this paper, we examine whether the business cycle plays a role in marriage 
and divorce. We use data on Spain, since the differences between recession and expansion 
periods across regions are quite pronounced in that country. We find that the unemployment rate 
is negatively associated with the marriage rate, pointing to a pro-cyclical evolution of marriage; 
however the response of the divorce rate to the business cycle is mixed. Results show the 
existence of different patterns, depending on geography: divorce rates in coastal regions are pro-
cyclical, while in inland regions divorces react to unemployment in a counter-cyclical way. 
Other factors, such as changes in divorce law and duration of the marriage also have a 
significant effect on divorce rates.   
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The effects of the business cycle are usually measured in terms of unemployment rates, 
or price and poverty indices, but it also has strong social and individual implications. 
For instance, economic conditions can affect family stability. Individual decisions about 
getting married or divorced, or planning a pregnancy, can vary considerably depending 
on the employment situation of the spouses. In this paper, we examine how marriage 
and divorce in Spain change in response to the economic environment. Most of the 
scarce economic literature studying the impact of business cycles on marriage and 
divorce has focused on the US case, generally finding a negative effect of 
unemployment rates on both outcomes (Amato and Beattie, 2011; Hellerstein and 
Morrill, 2011; Schaller, 2013). Less work has been done on the analysis of this issue for 
other countries; as an exception, we find the studies by Fischer and Liefbroer (2006) 
examining the Netherlands case, Jensen and Smith (1990) for Denmark, and Ariizumi et 
al. (2015) for Canada. In our work, we analyse the Spanish case. Spain is characterized 
as a country with pronounced recessions and significant volatility (Bentolila et al., 
2012). For example, before the last Great Recession, Spain exhibited unemployment 
rates around 8% (INE, Instituto Nacional de Estadística) while, in the US, 
unemployment was around 4-5% in the period 2005-2007 (US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics). However, in Spain, the unemployment rate reached 25% during the 
economic crisis (INE), tripling that of the economic expansion period, whereas in the 
US the maximum rate was around 10% in 2009 and now is back close to 6% (US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). Do such great variations in the unemployment rate 
affect marriage and/or divorce decisions? 1 
 From a theoretical point of view, the relationship of the unemployment rate to 
both marriage and divorce is ambiguous. The early studies by Becker, of marital 
decision-making (Becker, 1973), based on utility-maximizing individuals who choose to 
marry when the expected lifetime utility derived from marriage exceeds the expected 
utility from remaining single, predict a positive relationship between male job losses 
and the likelihood of remaining single, within a framework of specialization where the 
man is the breadwinner. According to Hoynes et al. (2012), since the empirical evidence 
indicates a greater negative impact on male employment than on that of females in times 
                                                 
1 Of course, there are more determinants of divorce; e. g., unilateral divorce reforms (Friedberg, 1998; 
Wolfers, 2006), child custody and child support laws (González-Val and Marcén, 2012a), price stability 
(Nunley, 2010) or culture (Furtado et al., 2013) among others. 
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of economic crisis, we would expect a negative association between unemployment 
rates and marriage rates. Other research suggests an opposite relationship, where 
marriage is considered as insurance against poor economic conditions (Shore, 2009; 
Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). Then, following this argument, marriage and 
unemployment should be positively associated.  
In the case of divorce, Becker et al. (1977) extend Becker’s original model to 
marital instability. In this Beckerian framework, male job losses should increase the 
likelihood of divorce, again considering specialization. Contrary to this prediction, 
when marriage is viewed as insurance against economic hardship, it should be expected 
that the greater the unemployment rate, the lower the divorce rate. More recently, 
Ariizumi et al. (2015) suggest that the sign of the relationship between divorce and the 
unemployment rate depends on the balance of the economic crisis impacts on the gains 
derived from marriage, and on the quality of those without a partner that divorcees may 
potentially match with. It is also possible to find theoretical alternatives that explain the 
impact of the business cycle on divorce; for example, Amato and Beattie (2011) 
propose three perspectives: the psycho-social stress perspective, the cost of divorce 
perspective, and the hybrid perspective. The first perspective leads to a positive 
association between the unemployment rate and divorce, although the effect should be 
greater when the variables are lagged, since the stress of decreasing employment 
opportunities takes time to affect marital stability. From the cost-of-divorce perspective, 
a job loss can generate economic constraints, making access to a potentially-costly 
divorce more difficult; for that, the increase in the unemployment rate should be 
inversely related to the divorce rate. In the last case, combining the first two 
perspectives, studies suggest that the unemployment rate should be negatively 
associated with the divorce rate when both rates are measured in the same year, and 
positively associated when the divorce rate is measured in subsequent years. Then, a 
priori, the relationships between the business cycle and patterns of marriage and divorce 
are less clear. 
 To shed light on this theoretical debate, only a few papers have empirically 
studied the role of business cycle fluctuations in determining marriage and divorce 
rates. Early studies conclude that both marriage and divorce rates are pro-cyclical 
(Ogburn and Thomas, 1922; Stouffer and Spencer, 1936; Kirk and Thomas, 1960; 
Silver, 1965). More recent works, using state-level data, or individual-level data for the 
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US, also find a negative effect of economic recession on divorce rates (Amato and 
Beattie, 2011; Hellerstein and Morrill, 2011; Hellerstein et al., 2013; Schaller, 2013; 
Baghestani and Malcolm, 2014) and on marriage rates (Schaller, 2013). As an 
exception, South (1985) detects a small positive relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the divorce rate, using US national-level data. In the case of the 
Netherlands, Fischer and Liefbroer (2006) show a negative effect of consumer 
confidence on divorce rate. For Denmark, Jensen and Smith (1990), utilizing panel data 
for a sample of married couples, suggest that unemployment is an important 
determinant of marital instability. Their results indicate an immediate positive effect of 
a husband’s job loss on divorce probability. Similarly, Doiron and Mendolia (2011) 
show evidence that involuntary job losses have a positive impact on the probability of 
divorce, using the British Household Panel Survey. However, Ariizumi et al. (2015) 
find no effect of unemployment on divorce in an analysis of the Canadian case, but their 
findings indicate a clear negative impact of male unemployment on the Canadian 
marriage rate. Finally, González-Val and Marcén (2015) carry out a cross-country 
analysis using panel data from 29 European countries, from 1991 to 2012, finding that 
the unemployment rate negatively affected the divorce rate during that period. To our 
knowledge, there is no other paper examining this issue using data from Spain. The only 
related study is the work of Gutiérrez-Domènech (2008), who finds that the negative 
impact of unemployment on fertility decisions in Spain may be due to the postponement 
of marriage, pointing to an inverse relationship between unemployment and marriage. 
 In our main empirical analysis, we use Spanish data on marriage and divorce 
rates from 1998 to 2013, measured at the province level (NUTS III regions). As in prior 
studies, to capture the business cycle behaviour we use information on regional 
unemployment rates. We find no statistically significant results after including controls 
for unobservable characteristics that can vary over time, and for other observable 
characteristics. The same result is obtained when using the male unemployment rate, 
rather than the whole unemployment rate. Moreover, we repeat the analysis by splitting 
the sample into two periods, to check whether our results are driven by variations in 
legislation. In 2005, there was a significant divorce law reform that reduced the costs of 
divorce, making it more accessible. Even after this liberalization of the divorce law, our 
results show a clear negative relationship between the unemployment rate (regardless of 
the way in which this is measured) and the divorce rate. 
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 Additionally, we consider regional characteristics in the analysis, inasmuch as 
Spain presents clear dissimilarities in the divorce and unemployment patterns across 
regions, with those regions with high divorce rates and high seasonality in employment 
demand being primarily located on the coasts. Differences in the attitudes towards 
divorce and unemployment could be driving our results if, for instance, a divorce 
because of a job loss in an area with high seasonality in employment demand would be 
less acceptable than in a region where unemployment is indicative of the reduced 
economic suitability of a partner (Doiron and Mendolia, 2011). Our findings point to 
clear differences in regional patterns, suggesting that the divorce rate responds in a 
counter-cyclical way in inland regions, but in a pro-cyclical way in coastal regions.  
 This work also explores the relationship between the business cycle and different 
kinds of divorce (with/without mutual consent), providing further evidence in favour of 
the relevance of the business cycle to divorce decisions. When couples divorce under 
mutual consent, the divorce process normally ends within a few months and so the 
effect of the contemporary business cycle situation should be detected. However, those 
who do not agree in their divorce process usually spend significant time involved in 
judicial processes (perhaps as much as several years); then, for those couples, we would 
not expect to find any relationship between the contemporary business cycle and the 
contemporary divorce rate since the business cycle situation when they took the divorce 
decision may not correspond to the situation when the divorce process is final. 
 If economic constraints vary during marriage, it would be expected that the 
response of married individuals to business cycle variations changes, depending on the 
number of years of marriage (Arkes and Shen, 2014). For example, a job loss in a young 
married couple may indicate a lower level of economic suitability of a partner, which 
decreases the potential gains derived from marriage. In addition, those who have been 
married fewer years are less likely to have children and less likely to have certain assets 
in common, so divorce would be potentially less costly. Thus, for those young couples, 
we would expect a positive relationship between unemployment and divorce. Similarly 
to Arkes and Shen (2014), we find differences in the relationship between divorce and 
unemployment by stage of marriage. 
 Regarding the association between marriage and unemployment, our findings 
point to a pro-cyclical response of the marriage rate, regardless of the sample used, the 
geography, the measure of marriage and unemployment rates, and the controls for 
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unobserved and observed characteristics. The inverse relationship between marriage and 
the unemployment rate is observed in both coastal and inland regions. Nonetheless, 
those living in inland regions are less likely to get married when the unemployment rate 
increases than those living in coastal regions. This is consistent with our findings on the 
relationship between divorce and unemployment, suggesting that unemployment is less 
acceptable in marriage for those living inland. 
 Taking into consideration the works of Schaller (2013) and Amato and Beattie 
(2011), we can hypothesize that there may be a lag impact of the unemployment rate on 
divorce and marriage rates. This is the case since couples may react by putting off their 
marital decisions if there are changes in labour market conditions. To examine this 
issue, we have considered lagged unemployment rates in our analysis. Although the 
duration of the lag is not clear, we use lags from 1 to 2 years, since in Spain the 
minimum legal separation period required to obtain a divorce was 2 years, until the 
divorce law reform of 2005, and even after what is known as the ‘express divorce law,’ 
there can be a period of time between the decision to divorce and when the divorce 
process can become final. Results show that the contemporary unemployment rate 
impacts both marriage and divorce, but no dynamic effects can be found. 
 Since divorce rates are quite different between coastal and inland regions, it is 
possible to argue that our results are simply a consequence of a nonlinear response of 
that variable to the business cycle, rather than an opposite response of divorce to the 
unemployment rate in coastal and inland regions. To tackle this issue, we explore the 
potential nonlinear response of marriage and divorce rates to the fluctuations of the 
business cycle, using quantile regressions. Our results show that, depending on the level 
of marriage and divorce rates, the impact of the unemployment rate on marital decisions 
does not substantially vary. This is even more remarkable when we examine the 
differences in the impact of unemployment by coastal and inland regions where, for 
instance, the relationship of the unemployment rate to the divorce rate in inland regions 
remains almost unchanged, regardless of the level of the divorce rate.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data 
used. In Section 3, we describe the methodology and the main regression results. 
Section 4 shows the lag specifications. The nonlinear analysis is presented in Section 5, 




In order to implement this analysis, we use data from 50 Spanish provinces (NUTS III 
regions).2 The divorce rate is defined as the annual absolute number of divorces per 
thousand inhabitants in each region. The available data on divorce covers the period 
1998 to 2013 (INE).3 This ‘crude’ divorce rate represents the standard measure of the 
level of, and changes in, divorce. Nonetheless, the rates may be affected by the marital 
status structure of the populations to which they relate. Divorce rates may be low, either 
because marriage rates are low, or because marriages are less likely to end in divorce. 
To explore this issue, we could have used an alternative definition of divorce rates, 
measured as the annual number of divorces per 1,000 of the married population. This 
analysis would have been less reliable due to the scarcity of data on the total number of 
marriages, which is only available when each census is collected, normally every 10 
years (see Furtado et al., 2013). For that reason, we favour the use of the crude divorce 
rate, although our analysis has been repeated with the divorce rate calculated as the 
annual number of divorces per 1,000 married inhabitants. Results do not change.4 
The evolution of the crude divorce rate at the national level is presented in 
Figure 1. The average divorce rate slightly increases from 1998 to 2004. After that, we 
observe a sharp rise in this rate until 2006, coinciding with the introduction of the so-
called ‘express divorce law’ in 2005. This reform eliminated the legal separation period 
requirements to obtain a divorce and introduced the notion of unilateral divorce in 
Spain. Under this new regime, divorce can be granted at the request of either spouse if 
both spouses have been married for at least 3 months.5 From 2006, the divorce rate 
decreases and has been maintained around 2.1 divorces per thousand individuals since 
2008, until the end of our sample in 2013. The average marriage rate is also plotted. 
This is calculated as the annual number of marriages per thousand inhabitants in each 
region. As in the case of the divorce rate, this is a common measure of marriage in the 
literature, but it does not properly consider the population that could legally get married. 
To tackle this issue, we have re-run this work using as dependent variable a rate 
calculated as the annual number of marriages per thousand of non-married inhabitants. 
Results are maintained, while being aware of the concerns that the scarce information 
                                                 
2 Ceuta and Melilla, located on the African coast, are excluded from the analysis. 
3 There is no information on the Spanish divorce rate at the province level for the period 1981 to 1997. 
4 These results are shown in the Appendix, see Tables A1 to A3 and A6. 
5 As can be seen in the next Section, we take into account this change of the divorce law in the empirical 
analysis. 
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on that population (non-married inhabitants), normally only available every 10 years, 
can generate.6 As shown in Figure 1, the marriage rate increased a little until 2000, 
followed by a period of relative stability around an average rate of 5.1. After 2005, a fall 
in the marriage rate is observed that continues until 2011, with the drop being more 
pronounced since 2007. In 2012, the average marriage rate increased a little, then 
decreased again in 2013.  
The other variable of interest in our work is the unemployment rate. 
Unemployment refers to the share of the labour force that is without a job, but is 
available for and seeking employment. It is a common indicator of economic 
conditions, highly publicized and used, which captures not only the effects of individual 
job losses but also the variations in economic uncertainty. As Schaller (2013) claims, 
the unemployment rate can be useful in exploring marital behaviour, since it is less 
likely to be endogenous to divorce and marriage decisions than other income or 
employment variables, such as own wages. The unemployment rate is defined here as 
the percentage of unemployed individuals in the labour force (sum of the employed and 
unemployed), and the data is provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (the 
Spanish Statistical Office). It includes changes in both labour demand and labour 
supply. As Schaller (2013) points out, despite the weaknesses of this variable (it can 
understate the magnitude of a recession by not incorporating discouraged workers, and 
it can be a lagged indicator of economic recession), it is considered the best available 
proxy to capture changes in the labour market conditions of married and unmarried 
individuals. Data on the unemployment rate come from the Labour Force Survey and it 
is available for all the period considered in this analysis at the regional level (NUTS III 
regions).7 Its pattern of behaviour is presented in Figure 1. As mentioned above, the 
fluctuations of this variable in Spain are considerable. From 1998 to 2001, the average 
unemployment rate fell dramatically. After a stable rate around 10% until 2004, there 
was detected another fall until 2007. Since then, the rate has followed a very steep 
slope, reaching levels of almost 25% during the period known as the Great Recession.  
Another potential problem with the use of the unemployment rate is that 
variations in the rate can be due to changes in marriage and divorce situations (Schaller, 
2013). Non-married women appear to be more likely to enter the labour market than 
                                                 
6 These results are shown in the Appendix, see Tables A4, A5 and A7. 
7 The Labour Force Survey is collected using the same EUROSTAT methodology in all European 
countries.  
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married women; then, in the case that fewer individuals married or many individuals 
become divorced, more women may be participating in the labour market (Fernández 
and Wong, 2014a; 2014b). Nevertheless, it is not clear whether decreases or increases in 
women’s participation in the labor market correspond with variations in the overall 
unemployment rate (Schaller, 2013). Additionally, the rise in divorce rates has been 
found to account for a very small part of the increase in female employment rates 
(Eckstein and Lifshitz, 2011). To tackle this issue, as proposed by Schaller (2013), we 
also use the male unemployment rate (the percentage of men in the labour force who are 
without a job but available for and seeking employment) in the analysis for the same 
period, because men are less likely to change their participation in the labour market 
depending on their marital situation. Figure 1 also displays the evolution of the male 
unemployment rate. As can be seen there, the pattern is similar to that of the total 
unemployment rate, although until 2008 this rate is lower than the total unemployment 
rate, since in Spain female unemployment rates are traditionally higher. After that, both 
total and male unemployment rates almost coincide; thus, male and female 
unemployment rates were quite similar during the economic crisis. 
This quick glance at the temporal evolution of the average marriage and divorce 
rates does not appear to reveal a clear relationship between the unemployment rate and 
marital decisions. It is worth noting that the decline of the marriage rate was greater in 
the period of the Great Recession, and that the divorce rate also decreased in that period. 
At the regional level, see Figure 2, significant differences across regions in the rates of 
divorce, marriage, and unemployment can be observed, but once again a clear pattern 
cannot be discerned. In contrast, by exploring the average marriage, divorce, and 
unemployment rates over the sample period for each region, Table 1, it is possible to 
infer certain regional patterns. Those regions with low divorce rates also have low 
marriage rates, with the exception of those settled in the Canary Islands, which present 
high divorce rates and low marriage rates. For the unemployment rate, the variations at 
the regional level are also quite relevant and persistent over time (Bentolila, 1997; 
Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998). Some regions maintained an average unemployment rate 
around 8% whereas this average rate was higher than 20% in other regions during the 
same period. These large dissimilarities are also detected when the evolution of these 
variables is plotted at the regional level, Figure 2, suggesting that economic constraints 
for couples can vary at the regional level.  
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The considerable differences highlighted above may indicate the necessity of a 
regional analysis of the impact of unemployment on both marriage and divorce. 
Additionally, using data at the national level could be problematic, since NUTS II 
regions have different divorce and marriage laws. For example, there are differences in 
the property regimes and in the child custody laws; then, as suggested by Wolfers 
(2006) and González-Val and Marcén (2012a), dissimilarities in those legal frameworks 
may influence both marriage and divorce decisions. If divorce is less costly in one 
region than in another, variations in the unemployment rate may have different effects 
in those regions.  
 
3. Methodology and results 
Initially, we estimate the following equation: 
itiitititit TXUnempY   '' ,  (1) 
 
where itY  is the divorce (marriage) rate of region i in period t and itUnemp  is the 
unemployment rate of region i in period t. itX  is a set of demographic, geographic, and 







igion ) that 
allows us to pick up the impact of unobserved characteristics that can vary at the 
regional level. itT  is a matrix of time variables, incorporating a linear time trend, 
beginning in 2005, to capture the influence of the divorce law reform approved in 2005 
( tTimedivorce Express  since 2005), known as the ‘express divorce law,’ the 
corresponding quadratic trend to measure the nonlinear effect of the express divorce law 
























ti Timegion ), allowing us to control for unobserved characteristics that 
vary over time. it  is the error term. This framework exploits variations across regions 
in unemployment behaviour over time, as in Schaller (2013) and in Amato and Beattie 
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(2011). The identification strategy of the relationship between unemployment rates and 
both marriage and divorce rates is based on the exogeneity of variation in regional 
unemployment rates (Schaller, 2013). Theoretically, it is not clear whether marriage and 
divorce rates respond in a pro-cyclical way, or not. Then, the sign of the   coefficient 
could be positive (counter-cyclical response) or negative (pro-cyclical reaction).  
 
3.1 Divorce results 
Table 2 reports the estimates for Equation (1) when the dependent variable is the 
divorce rate. As can be seen in the first column, which does not include any control, the 
estimated coefficient capturing the effect of the regional unemployment rate is not 
statistically significant, whereas the coefficient picking up the effect of the regional 
male unemployment rate in the regression without controls, column (2), is positive and 
statistically significant, pointing to a counter-cyclical response of divorce to the 
fluctuations of the business cycle. Note that, as we explain above, we have repeated our 
analysis using male unemployment rates, which allows us to tackle the concerns that the 
use of female unemployment can generate.  
In columns (3) and (4), we include controls for region and year fixed effects, and 
for region-specific linear and quadratic time trends. We also add controls for observable 
characteristics. A geographical coastal region dummy is incorporated, since it could be 
that divorce incentives change between coastal and inland provinces because of the 
differences in the attitudes towards divorce. Those regions having high divorce rates, 
normally coastal regions, are more likely to be more accepting of divorce (Furtado et 
al., 2013). Besides the localization of the regions, the demographic characteristics of the 
population can also matter. If older individuals are less likely to get divorced (Peters, 
1986) and they are less likely to be unemployed, then the older the population, the lower 
the unemployment and divorce rates. Thus, it is possible to conjecture that our results 
are driven by the differences in the age structure of the population, in addition to the 
relationship between unemployment rates and divorce rates. To tackle this issue, we 
include as a control the median age at the regional level.8 In these specifications, both a 
linear time trend and a quadratic time trend, beginning in 2005, are also included in 
those specifications to capture the influence of the divorce law reform approved in 
2005. After the inclusion of all these controls, results for our variable of interest suggest 
                                                 
8 Data come from the INE. 
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that there is no significant relationship between unemployment and divorce. The 
coefficients picking up the effect of the unemployment rate (total in column (3) and 
male unemployment in column (4)) are not statistically significant, albeit negative. With 
respect to the estimated points capturing the effect of the controls, we observe a striking 
inverse relationship between being on the coast and the divorce rate. We revisit this 
issue below, since it suggests that the differences in the employment structure between 
coastal and inland regions can have an impact on our results. The impact of the median 
age is not statistically significant, which is in line with the findings of Bruze et al. 
(2015), who find that the costs of divorce are similar in the earlier and later stages of 
marriage, pointing to a lesser importance of the age-structure. The relationship between 
the liberalization of the divorce law and the divorce rate appears to have an inverted U-
shape. As we have described in the previous section, after the divorce law reform, the 
divorce rate considerably increases and some years later it is seen to fall. This is also 
observed in the reaction of divorce rates to divorce reforms in other countries (Wolfers, 
2006; González and Viitanen, 2009; González-Val and Marcén, 2012a, 2012b).  
In the last column of Table 2, the employment rate is added, following Schaller’s 
(2013) advice. Although these results should be taken with caution, since the 
employment rate incorporates the participation of women in the labour market, which, 
as explained above, can generate problems of endogeneity in this specification, it is 
comforting that our results do not vary after its incorporation. The effect of the 
employment rate is not statistically significant, suggesting that there is no relationship 
between the employment rate and the divorce rate. This finding is not what would  be 
expected if the higher the divorce rate the more likely would be the participation in the 
labour market, reducing endogeneity concerns. 
Although the inclusion of express divorce law controls does not appear to affect 
our estimates on the relationship between unemployment and divorce, we provide 
additional evidence by repeating the analysis, splitting the sample into two periods. We 
do that in order to test whether our results are driven by the liberalization of the divorce 
law that could change divorce incentives by making divorce easier. This is important in 
the analysis if the reduction in the divorce costs makes divorce more attractive for 
unemployed individuals in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform period. The 
pre-reform period covers from 1998 to 2004 and the post-reform period from 2005 
onwards. Results are shown in Table 3. On the one hand, columns (1) to (3) present the 
estimates corresponding to the pre-reform period, where we find no significant 
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coefficient of the impact of unemployment on divorce. On the other hand, using the 
post-reform sample, columns (4) to (9), the estimates capturing the impact of 
unemployment on divorce (regardless of the measure of unemployment and of the 
controls incorporated) are always negative and statistically significant, although only at 
the 10% level of significance for the total unemployment rate. Contrary to our 
expectations, in a framework of low divorce costs, we observe a clear negative 
relationship between unemployment and divorce, whereas in the pre-reform period no 
effect is detected. This could be explained by the long separation requirements 
(normally 2 years) of the pre-reform period, which can lead to the conclusion that the 
contemporary divorce and unemployment rates would not be related. However, during 
the pre-reform period, when both members of a married couple want to divorce, they 
could lie about the real separation period to considerably reduce the divorce process, 
making possible the association between contemporary divorce and unemployment 
rates. These findings could also be due to the fact that, during the pre-reform period, the 
unemployment rate remained stable in many regions, see Figure 2. Considerable 
differences in the evolution of the unemployment rate are only observed in a few of the 
regions. Thus, without important variations in the unemployment rate, if unemployment 
matters, we would expect the divorce rate to be maintained almost flat, and that is what 
we do observe in the estimates and in Figure 2.9 Another possibility is that regional 
differences in the response of the divorce rate to the unemployment rate are driving 
previous results.  
 As mentioned above, in Spain, those regions with high divorce rates are mainly 
located on the coast (including the two archipelagos), see Table 1. The map in Figure 3 
shows the spatial distribution of divorce rates in 2010, confirming a clear spatial pattern 
in divorce rates across the regions.10,11 Taking into account the argument that points to 
the high-divorce rate areas as having more accepting attitudes towards divorce, it is 
possible to conjecture that, in those areas, divorce costs are lower, considering both the 
divorce process and the social costs in terms of social ostracism (Fenelon, 1971; 
Furtado et al., 2013; Glenn and Shelton, 1985). In this framework, we would expect that 
                                                 
9 Note that there was a methodological change in the Spanish Labour Force Survey in 2001, which 
generated an abrupt change in the series in that period. To address this change, we add year fixed effects 
to our regressions.  
10 The maps for other periods, available from the authors upon request, are similar. 
11 Neither the unemployment nor the marriage rates exhibit the same geographical pattern, see Figures A1 
and A2 in the Appendix.  
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a job loss, which entails economic constraints, would be more likely to generate a 
divorce in a region with high divorce rates than in a region with low divorce rates. On 
the other hand, we cannot forget that a job loss also produces social costs and lower 
economic expectations for the unemployed member of the couple. In this case, the 
lower the social approval of a job loss for a member of a couple, the lower the gains 
derived from marriage and so the greater the probability of divorce. For Spain, we 
would expect greater acceptance of the unemployment situation in coastal regions, since 
those areas are characterised by seasonality of the employment demand (mainly due to 
the tourism industry).12 Additionally, since tourism also has a greater capacity to 
generate employment, even in times of economic crisis (Sánchez-Ollero et al., 2014), 
unemployed individuals in tourist areas would have greater expectations of finding a 
job, which would not be expected to increase the probability of divorce. However, a 
divorce can be more acceptable in an area with lower attitudes towards divorce if a 
partner is unemployed, since it indicates that he/she is not an economically- suitable 
partner (Doiron and Mendolia, 2011). To sum up, divorce decisions in a situation of 
unemployment will depend on the balance between the social costs of divorce and that 
of unemployment. To examine this issue, we introduce an interaction between the 
unemployment rate and a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a province (NUTS III 
regions) is located on the coast or in an archipelago, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1) to (3) 
of Table 4 report the estimates. Results indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in 
the unemployment rate in an inland region involves 0.017 more divorces per thousand 
inhabitants, whereas in a coastal region, that same increase involves 0.015 fewer 
divorces per thousand inhabitants. Both effects are statistically significant. The opposite 
behaviour that these results suggest could help to explain the estimates shown in Table 
2, where no relationship is detected between unemployment and divorce. The 
coefficients remain unchanged, regardless of the unemployment rate measure, and do 
not vary with the introduction of the employment rate in column (3). The impact is 
small, which is not surprising in the literature (see for example Schaller, 2013), but 
significant, representing around 1% of the average divorce rate in Spain during the 
period considered. 
The regional pattern described above can also be explained by population 
movements. During economic recessions, individuals are less likely to move to tourist 
                                                 
12 Yearly data on employment by industry by region is not available, but differences in productive 
structures across regions should be controlled by the region fixed-effects. 
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areas because of the economic constraints. However, they may go out and socialise in 
greater proportion in their areas of residence, increasing the probability of meeting new 
potential partners, which following Ariizumi et al. (2015) may increase the likelihood of 
divorce, whereas, in coastal regions, there are fewer potential partners to match with 
(decreasing the probability of divorce). One can also surmise that the differences in the 
impact of the economic crisis on individual assets can be driving these results if, for 
instance, the economic crisis decreases the price of houses more in coastal regions than 
in inland regions. Then, married couples in coastal regions would postpone their divorce 
decisions in greater proportion than those couples living in inland regions although, 
with this explanation, opposite results are not expected.13 Additionally, since there is a 
large number of married couples who reside in inland areas who have a second 
residence on the coast, the variation in the price of the houses on the coast would also 
impact their divorce decision; this could lead to behaviour that would be more similar to 
that of married couples residing in the coastal regions, contrary to our findings. 
Weather conditions can also be responsible, at least in part, for the possible 
social interactions that can justify those results and the potential divorce decisions of 
couples. As explained by Connolly (2013), weather conditions impact both mood and 
prosocial behaviour. Then, it could be argued that the better the weather conditions, the 
greater the possibility of meeting more potential partners for divorcees to match with, 
because individuals spend more time outside and the number of social interactions 
increases. Apart from that, the better the weather conditions in a region, the more likely 
is that region to receive tourists, and so, to increase the employment demand of the 
tourist industry which may decrease the probability of divorce. Therefore, if controls for 
weather conditions are not added, results can be biased. Taking this into account, we 
add to the specification the following weather controls: the annual average precipitation, 
the annual number of cloudless days, the annual average temperature, the annual 
number of days with temperatures greater than 25ºC, and the annual number of days 
with temperatures below 0ºC, all measured at the regional level.14 Table 4 shows the 
estimated coefficients in columns (4) to (7). Results appear to confirm the opposite 
response in the coastal and inland regions, even after the inclusion of those weather 
                                                 
13 Only the opposite movement in house prices in inland and coastal regions can explain an opposite 
reaction of couples. However, this was not the case in Spain. Blanco et al. (2015) study regional house 
price convergence in Spain during the housing boom, identifying four different convergence clubs in 
house prices among Spanish regions. 
14 Data come from the INE. 
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variables, confirming that the divorce rate behaves in a counter-cyclical way in inland 
regions but in a pro-cyclical way in coastal regions.  
 A placebo test is also carried out. If it is the business cycle variation that matters, 
we would not expect to find a relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
divorce rate for divorces without mutual consent. The contemporary economic situation 
is not relevant in those cases, since the divorce process without mutual consent takes a 
long time to be finalized, usually some years, with lengthy judicial proceedings. But, 
when couples divorce under mutual consent, the process is usually final in a few 
months, and so we would expect a significant effect of the contemporary business cycle 
situation on the divorce rate. Table 5 shows the results. Reinforcing our argument that 
the business cycle plays a role in divorce decisions, we observe that, after separating the 
sample by divorce type (with/without mutual consent), those divorces under mutual 
consent dominate the pro-cyclical response in coastal regions, and the counter-cyclical 
in inland regions, while, as expected, no effect is obtained when married couples do not 
achieve agreement to divorce. 
As in Arkes and Shen (2014), by examining the impact of the business cycle 
variations on divorce rates at different stages of marriage, we can provide additional 
empirical evidence on the role of business cycle fluctuations in divorce decisions. As 
explained above, we would expect a positive relationship between unemployment and 
divorce for younger married couples, since they are less likely to have children and 
assets in common, so their divorce costs are lower than those in later stages of marriage. 
Additionally, a job loss for a young couple may indicate the economic unsuitability of 
the unemployed member of the couple, which would decrease the potential gains 
derived from marriage, making divorce more attractive. As times passes, individuals are 
more likely to have children and to accumulate assets in common, which considerably 
increases the costs of divorce, so, in that case, we would expect a negative association 
between unemployment and divorce. Nevertheless, after some years, children grow up 
and leave home, and mortgages are paid down and, once again, the costs of a possible 
divorce decrease, so unemployment and divorce should be more likely to be positively 
associated. These results are presented in Table 6, where the divorce rate varies 
depending on the years of marriage. As can be seen, we only obtain a negative 
association of those variables for couples married for a period between 11 and 19 years, 
while in the rest of the cases there are no statistically significant estimates. In Table 7, 
 16
the regional differences are included. Then, the positive association between divorce 
and unemployment, as expected, is observed for both young and old married couples in 
inland regions, and an inverse relationship is detected only for those married for 11 
years or more, with the impact being lower for those married individuals living in 
coastal regions for more than 20 years, suggesting that the divorce costs argument 
presented here may play a significant role. 
 
3.2 Marriage results 
Another objective of this work is to explore the relationship between marriage and the 
business cycle. Similarly to the analysis of the divorce rate, we use the unemployment 
rate as a proxy of the business cycle. Although, from a theoretical point of view, the 
effect is not clear, using Spanish data we find evidence pointing to the dominance of  
pro-cyclical behaviour, as in the studies by Schaller (2013) and Ariizumi et al. (2015). 
Note that, since the information on the marriage rate was collected at the regional level 
for more years than that of the divorce rate,15 we can repeat the analysis using a longer 
period, from 1985 to 2013. Results are reported in Table 8.16 All but one of the 
estimated coefficients on the relationship between unemployment and marriage are 
negative and statistically significant. The only one that is not statistically significant, 
although negative, is located in a regression without controls (column 1), but in this 
case we are not controlling for possible unobserved heterogeneity. It is worth noting 
that, when the employment rate is added to the specifications, see columns (11) and 
(12), the coefficient capturing the effect of this variable is not statistically significant, 
although it is positive after the inclusion of all controls, as in the case of the divorce rate 
analysis. This is not what we would expect if there were opposite reactions when 
couples change their marital status, reducing our concerns with the possible endogeneity 
problem. Our findings indicate that a one-percentage-point increase in the 
unemployment rate involves around 0.030 (0.033 in the case of the male unemployment 
rate) fewer marriages per thousand inhabitants, regardless of the period considered. As 
in the case of the relationship between the divorce rate and the unemployment rate, the 
                                                 
15 The average marriage rate by region for the sample for the period from 1985 to 2013 is shown in Table 
1. The unemployment rate is also calculated for the same period. Data come from the INE. 
16 We do not include controls for weather conditions, since this information is not available at the regional 
level from 1985 to 1997. 
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response of the marriage rate appears to be small, but it represents almost 1% of the 
average marriage rate in Spain.  
 To determine whether there are differences due to the localization of the regions, 
we have also re-run the analysis including an interaction between the unemployment 
rate and a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a province is located on the coast or in an 
archipelago, and 0 otherwise. Table 9 reports these estimates. In contrast to what we 
observed in the case of divorce, our results suggest that both those married couples 
living in coastal and in inland regions behave in a similar way. The response of the 
marriage rate to the variations in the unemployment rate appears to be pro-cyclical, 
regardless of the sample used and the measure of the unemployment rate. We find that a 
one-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate involves 0.037 (0.040 in the 
case of the male unemployment rate) fewer marriages per thousand inhabitants in inland 
regions, and 0.027 (0.029 in the case of the male unemployment rate) fewer marriages 
per thousand inhabitants for those living in coastal regions. Thus, the reduction in the 
number of marriages is greater in inland regions than in coastal regions. This is 
consistent with the results on the divorce rate, suggesting that those living in inland 
regions prefer not to be married, in a greater proportion than those in coastal regions 
when the economic constraints increase, since when unemployment rises they get 
married in a lower proportion than those in coastal regions, and they prefer to divorce if 
they are married. Thus, it appears that individuals in inland regions are less likely to 
view marriage as insurance, although it could be argued that, even in regions with low 
divorce rates (less accepting of divorce decisions), the postponement of marriage or 
divorce decisions is more acceptable during economic recession in inland regions.  
 
4. Lag specification 
Up to now, we have explored the contemporary relationship between unemployment 
rates and marriage and divorce rates. However, it is possible to surmise that couples 
react to changes in economic conditions by putting off their marital decisions because of 
the budget constraints that an unemployment situation may generate. A job loss can also 
produce a level of high emotional stress that can affect the stability of the relationship, 
which may lead to a decline in the number of marriages (Schaller, 2013). For those 
married couples, as in the case of non-married couples, the unemployment of one of the 
members of the couple, or even of both, produces cash-constraints. In this situation, it is 
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possible to argue that married individuals are more likely to support themselves together 
and postpone divorce decisions because they cannot afford to pursue a costly divorce.  
 To address this issue, we have included lagged unemployment rates in our 
analysis. As Schaller (2013) and Amato and Beattie (2011) explain, the length of the lag 
is not clear. We use lags from 1 to 2 years, since the minimum legal separation period 
required to obtain a divorce in Spain, until 2005, was 2 years. After the ‘express’ 
divorce law of 2005, although legal separation requirements were eliminated, it could be 
argued that the inclusion of lags is needed, since there could be a period of time 
between the divorce decision and when the divorce process is final. Results using the 
divorce rate as the dependent variable are shown in Table 10. Once again, we have 
incorporated all the specifications, with and without controls. As can be observed, when 
we do not add any control, the coefficients capturing the impact of the contemporary 
unemployment rate (total or male unemployment) are positive and statistically 
significant, whereas the coefficients picking up the effect of the lagged unemployment 
rate are negative and statistically significant, see columns (1) and (2). After adding all 
controls, we find that only the coefficient picking up the effect of the unemployment 
rate lag one period is statistically significant and negative, columns (3) and (4). But, 
when the possible regional differences are taken into consideration, in columns (5) to 
(7), we see that the contemporary unemployment rate is statistically significant, once 
again pointing to an opposite response for those married couples living in inland areas 
and in coastal areas. The estimates on the lagged unemployment are not significant, 
although the sign of the coefficients coincides in coastal and inland regions when the 
unemployment rate is lagged one period, which may explain why the estimates on the 
lagged unemployment rate are statistically significant in columns (3) and (4). All in all, 
our findings indicate that the contemporary unemployment rate is the only one that is 
relevant in divorce decisions. 
In Table 11, we present the results on the impact of the variations of the business 
cycle on marriage. In specifications without controls, columns (1) to (6), the sign of the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the marriage rate appears to change 
over time. However, as previously, those results could be biased. Then, we should focus 
on the estimated coefficients presented in columns (7) to (12). In that case, we see that 
the contemporary unemployment rate is negatively associated with the marriage rate, 
pointing to a pro-cyclical behaviour of this variable, regardless of the rate used (total or 
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male unemployment rate). The rest of the coefficients on the lagged regional 
unemployment rate are not statistically significant, columns (7) and (8). When the 
period considered is extended from 1985 to 2013, the coefficient on the unemployment 
rate lagged one period is also statistically significant, although only at the 10% level of 
significance, columns (9) and (11), but negative, once again pointing to a pro-cyclical 
response of the marriage rate to fluctuations in the business cycle. 
 
5. Nonlinear analysis 
In this section, we use an alternative approach. One important issue with the previous 
estimations, derived from linear models, is the existence of possible nonlinear 
behaviours. Some of the variation in divorce and marriage rates may reflect the fact that 
the influence of certain regional characteristics, particularly the unemployment rate, is 
not the same across the distribution of divorce and marriage rates. This is important to 
our analysis, since we observe a response of the divorce rate to the unemployment rate 
in the coastal regions (normally characterised with high divorce rates) different from 
that of the inland regions (usually with low divorce rates). It can be conjectured that 
those differences are due to a nonlinear response of the divorce rate to the 
unemployment rate. Thus, if it is just the level of the divorce rate that matters, for 
example, we would observe that the greater the divorce rate in an inland region, the 
more likely are the individuals living in those regions to behave as those in the coastal 
regions, and then, to respond in a pro-cyclical way. 
To model these possible heterogeneous effects of the unemployment rate on the 
divorce and marriage rates, we estimate quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett, 
1978). The quantile regression version of the linear model shown in Equation (1) can be 
written as 
          itiitititit TXUnempY   '' .  (2) 
Note that the estimated parameters are  -dependent in this case, where   is the 
corresponding quantile of the divorce (marriage) rate. Quantile regressions provide a 
richer characterization of the data, allowing us to consider the impact of the 
unemployment rate on the entire distribution of Y , and not merely its conditional mean. 
Quantile regressions take into account unobserved heterogeneity and allow for 
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heteroskedasticity among the disturbances, non-normal errors, and are more robust to 
outliers than standard OLS regressions.17  
 Figures 4 and 5 show the quantile regression results for the divorce and marriage 
rates models of Equation 2, respectively (the estimated coefficients are shown in Tables 
A8 to A13 in the Appendix). The different graphs display the estimates of the 
coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals for the unemployment rate across the nine 
quantiles considered (ranges from 0.1 to 0.9). The models include all the controls, and 
our estimates are weighted by population. As in the previous estimates, we find no 
statistically-significant coefficients on the impact of unemployment on divorce; only the 
male unemployment rate appears to have an effect on divorce in the top quantile (0.9), 
see Figure 4. This would suggest that unemployment is not relevant in divorce 
decisions. When we separate the impact between coastal and inland regions, Figure 5, it 
is clear that the two opposite patterns also detected with the OLS estimations could 
explain the previous result on the non-effect of unemployment on divorce. With these 
estimates, we are interested in determining whether there is a different response of 
married couples to the level of the divorce rate in their region. For example, focusing on 
the case of those living in inland regions, for which a positive impact is obtained, the 
statistically-significant estimates of the quantile regressions on the relationship between 
unemployment and divorce are all around 0.012 and 0.014. Then, the response does not 
appear to be different in inland regions with low and high divorce rates. These findings 
suggest that it is not only the level of the divorce rate that matters. In the case of 
marriage, all coefficients are negative and statistically significant, again indicating that 
marriages respond in a pro-cyclical way to variations in the business cycle. Although 
there are few changes in the estimates by quantile, a U-shaped pattern can be observed: 
the decrease in the number of marriages, when the unemployment rate increases, 
appears to be lower for those situated in the bottom and top quantiles, but the response 
of the marriage rate does not change so much as that observed in the linear analysis. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the relationship between variations in the business cycle and 
marriage and divorce rates. We use Spanish data for the period from 1998 to 2013. 
                                                 
17 Moreover, quantile regressions are invariant to monotonic transformations of the dependent variable, 
such as logarithms. 
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Since Spain is a country with significant business cycle fluctuations, we consider that it 
provides an appropriate framework to explore how those changes impact marriage and 
divorce decisions. As a proxy for the evolution of the business cycle, the unemployment 
rate is used.  
Our results suggest that the pro-cyclical behaviour of the marriage rate 
dominates in the Spanish case. We find a negative relationship between the 
unemployment rate and the marriage rate regardless of the sample used, of the measure 
of the unemployment rate, and of the controls included in the analysis. Then, an 
increase in the unemployment rate is related to a decrease in the marriage rate, which is 
in line with the theoretical approach that indicates that the economic constraints 
generated by a job loss and/or the lower economic expectations during an economic 
recession period are associated with lower probabilities to engage in marriage.  
Regarding the evolution of the divorce rate, we find opposite behaviours, 
depending on geography. The divorce rate in inland regions increases when the 
unemployment rate rises, whereas the divorce rate in coastal regions decreases with the 
same movement of the unemployment rate. In this paper, we suggest that the differences 
in the levels of divorce (with this being higher in coastal regions), which can be due to 
different attitudes towards divorce, in addition to the differences in the employment 
demand (with greater seasonality on the coast because of the tourism) can be 
responsible for that behaviour. Moreover, we propose an alternative explanation. The 
access for possible divorcees to potential partners decreases in coastal regions during 
economic crisis (because of the drop in the number of tourists), which can translate into 
lower divorce rates, whereas in inland regions, the number of potential partners 
increases (people move in a lower proportion to tourist areas, but increase their social 
activities in the residential areas) which can increase the probability of divorce. 
We recognize that the impact of the unemployment rate on both marriage and 
divorce appears to be small although, in both cases, it represents around 1% of the 
average divorce and marriage rates. All these results are maintained after the 
incorporation of controls for certain observable characteristics, such as the median age 
of the population, weather conditions, and even the divorce law reforms, in addition to 
controls for unobservable characteristics that can vary at the regional level and over 
time. Our findings on the pro-cyclical response of marriage rates and the mixed results 
on divorce are also observed, even when we consider a timing analysis by introducing 
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lagged unemployment rates. Results suggest that the contemporary unemployment rate 
is the most important factor in divorce and marriage decisions. Finally, the analysis of a 
possible nonlinear response of our outcomes of interest (marriage and divorce) to the 
unemployment rate does not present significantly different results from that of the linear 
analysis, although it is important to provide evidence that our results are not driven by 
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Notes: Data source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). The vertical red line 
indicates the ‘express divorce’ law reform approved in 2005. 
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Notes: Data source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). The vertical red line 
indicates the ‘express divorce’ law reform approved in 2005. 
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Figure 3. Divorce rate by region, 2010 
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    (c) Marriage rate vs. Unemployment   (d) Marriage rate vs. Male unemployment 
 
Note: Endogenous variables: (a)-(b) Crude divorce rate, (c)-(d) Marriage rate. Estimates weighted by 
region population. All the models include a constant, the unemployment rate, the median age, a 
coastal region dummy, a linear and quadratic time trend beginning in 2005, to capture the influence 
of the ‘express divorce’ law reform approved in 2005, region fixed effects, region-specific linear and 
quadratic time trends, and time fixed effects; (b) and (d) also include the employment rate. Estimated 
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Coastal region x Male unemployment rate
 
               (b) Male unemployment and Coastal region x Male unemployment rate 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate. Estimates weighted by region population. Both 
models include a constant, the unemployment rate, the interaction between the unemployment rate 
and the coastal status of the region, the median age, a coastal region dummy, a linear and quadratic 
time trend beginning in 2005, to capture the influence of the ‘express divorce’ law reform approved 
in 2005, region fixed effects, region-specific linear and quadratic time trends, and time fixed effects; 
(b) also includes the employment rate. Estimated coefficients are shown in Tables A12 and A13 in 
the Appendix.  
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Álava 9.84 1.41 4.32 4.58 
Albacete 15.80 1.31 4.25 4.90 
Alicante 16.14 1.87 4.40 4.79 
Almería 18.96 1.55 4.45 5.12 
Asturias 13.89 1.92 4.28 4.48 
Ávila 14.17 0.84 3.38 3.76 
Badajoz 22.32 1.12 4.39 4.89 
Balears (Illes) 12.17 2.20 4.56 5.23 
Barcelona 12.81 2.18 4.49 4.88 
Burgos 11.16 1.10 3.85 4.12 
Cáceres 19.23 1.06 3.73 4.36 
Cádiz 26.96 1.63 4.87 5.28 
Cantabria 12.11 1.68 4.75 4.74 
Castellón 12.91 1.75 4.69 5.06 
Ciudad Real 16.36 1.19 4.23 4.89 
Córdoba 24.17 1.38 4.76 5.34 
Coruña (A) 13.41 1.64 4.14 4.47 
Cuenca 12.81 0.89 3.35 3.98 
Girona 12.55 1.93 4.08 4.61 
Granada 22.57 1.59 4.50 5.10 
Guadalajara 12.02 1.35 5.05 5.13 
Guipúzcoa 8.47 1.39 4.56 4.59 
Huelva 22.83 1.54 4.72 5.06 
Huesca 8.23 1.18 3.58 3.98 
Jaén 21.85 1.23 4.40 5.05 
León 13.65 1.40 3.44 3.87 
Lleida 8.54 1.67 4.22 4.58 
Lugo 10.44 1.25 3.20 3.65 
Madrid 11.49 1.77 4.77 5.11 
Málaga 21.24 1.89 4.74 5.12 
Murcia 15.61 1.58 4.67 5.27 
Navarra 8.63 1.35 4.48 4.72 
Ourense 13.42 1.42 3.30 3.71 
Palencia 12.36 1.09 3.57 3.98 
Palmas (Las) 18.81 2.42 3.58 4.72 
Pontevedra 15.59 1.75 4.19 4.42 
Rioja (La) 10.05 1.47 4.41 4.66 
Salamanca 15.45 1.14 3.82 4.16 
Santa Cruz de Tenerife 17.87 2.43 3.65 4.53 
Segovia 10.84 0.92 3.83 4.20 
Sevilla 22.49 1.67 5.19 5.52 
Soria 7.98 0.94 3.30 3.67 
Tarragona 12.57 2.04 4.64 4.99 
Teruel 8.60 0.85 3.45 3.86 
Toledo 15.40 1.11 4.68 5.00 
Valencia 15.44 2.06 5.05 5.26 
Valladolid 13.79 1.37 4.51 4.39 
Vizcaya 12.57 1.47 4.21 4.37 
Zamora 14.38 0.95 2.95 3.45 
Zaragoza 10.52 1.51 4.46 4.78 
Total 14.63 1.49 4.20 4.61 
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Table 2. Divorce rate models, OLS estimates, 1998–2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unemployment rate 0.005  -0.006   
 (0.005)  (0.006)   
Male unemployment rate  0.022***  -0.007 -0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Employment rate     0.004 
     (0.008) 
Coastal region   -2.495*** -2.388*** -4.003** 
   (0.693) (0.699) (1.439) 
Median age   -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 
   (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Express divorce law x Time   0.260*** 0.271*** 0.259*** 
   (0.060) (0.064) (0.065) 
Express divorce law x Time2   -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Regional fixed effects N N Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N Y Y Y 
Region x Time N N Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 N N Y Y Y 
R2 0.002 0.052 0.983 0.983 0.983 
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are 
weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 3. Divorce rate and divorce law 
  Before ‘express divorce’ law (1998-2004) After ‘express divorce’ law (2005-2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unemployment rate -0.006   -0.023* -0.023*     
 (0.004)   (0.012) (0.012)     
Male unemployment rate  -0.007 -0.005   -0.023** -0.023** -0.021** -0.021** 
  (0.007) (0.007)   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Employment rate   0.005     -0.038 -0.038 
   (0.006)     (12.312) (12.312) 
Coastal region -1.390*** -1.429*** -0.773 -1.382 -1.382 0.419 0.419 -0.372 -0.372 
 (0.397) (0.464) (0.770) (11.187) (11.187) (11.987) (11.987) (0.505) (0.505) 
Median age -0.010 -0.013 -0.002 -0.369 -0.369 -0.381 -0.381 0.005 0.005 
 (0.150) (0.152) (0.158) (0.482) (0.482) (0.501) (0.501) (0.016) (0.016) 
Express divorce law x Time     0.178***  0.208***  0.201*** 
     (0.047)  (0.053)  (0.057) 
Express divorce law x Time2     -0.003  -0.006  -0.005 
     (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.973 0.973 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.974 
Observations 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are 
weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4. Divorce rate and geography 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unemployment rate 0.017***   -0.006  0.018***  
 (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.006)  
Coastal region x Unemployment rate -0.032***     -0.033***  
 (0.008)     (0.007)  
Male unemployment rate  0.017*** 0.017***  -0.005  0.018*** 
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate  -0.032*** -0.032***    -0.033*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)    (0.007) 
Employment rate   -0.0004  0.004  -0.001 
   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Median age 0.036 0.047 0.047 -0.007 -0.007 0.048 0.058 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.092) (0.093) (0.092) (0.093) 
Express divorce law x Time 0.265*** 0.239*** 0.240*** 0.282*** 0.260*** 0.287*** 0.243*** 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.072) (0.062) (0.064) (0.066) (0.070) 
Express divorce law x Time2 -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Weather controls N N N Y Y Y Y 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p-value (F-test of Coastal region x 
Unemployment rate + Unemployment rate=0) 0.0408 0.0393 0.0723   0.0374 0.0508 
R2 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.983 0.983 0.985 0.985 
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate, 1998-2013. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All 
regressions are weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Weather controls: Annual average precipitation, annual number of cloudless days, annual average temperature, annual number of days with 
temperatures greater than 25ºC, annual number of days with temperature lower than 0ºC, measured at the province level. 
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Table 5. Divorce rate with/without mutual consent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 With mutual consent Without mutual consent 
Unemployment rate -0.006  0.012**  -0.001  0.006  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  
Coastal region x Unemployment rate   -0.024***    -0.009**  
   (0.006)    (0.004)  
Male unemployment rate  -0.005  0.011**  -0.0003  0.007 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate    -0.023***    -0.010** 
    (0.006)    (0.004) 
Employment rate  0.007  0.003  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Median age -0.203** -0.201** -0.162* -0.156* 0.200*** 0.199*** 0.214*** 0.218*** 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087) (0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) 
Express divorce law x Time 0.308*** 0.290*** 0.312*** 0.278*** -0.030 -0.034 -0.029 -0.039 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.062) (0.063) (0.032) (0.037) (0.031) (0.036) 
Express divorce law x Time2 -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Weather controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p-value (F-test of Coastal region x 
Unemployment rate + Unemployment rate=0)   0.0370 0.0609   0.4993 0.4690 
R2 0.980 0.980 0.981 0.982 0.945 0.945 0.946 0.947 
Observations 800 800 800 800 350 350 450 450 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate, 1998-2013. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All 
regressions are weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6. Divorce rate by duration of marriage  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 1-2 years 3-10 years 11-19 years More than 20 years 
Unemployment rate -0.001  -0.001  -0.005**  -0.002  
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
Male unemployment rate  -0.001  -0.002  -0.007***  -0.003 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Employment rate  0.0003  -0.0004  -0.002  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Coastal region 0.124 0.713*** -0.654* 0.325 -1.467*** -0.639** -0.448 -0.590 
 (0.190) (0.214) (0.385) (0.384) (0.280) (0.299) (0.279) (0.376) 
Median age -0.046** -0.046** -0.059 -0.061 0.007 0.001 0.066 0.065 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) 
Express divorce law x Time 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.318*** 0.318*** 0.160*** 0.177*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.044) 
Express divorce law x Time2 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Weather controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.960 0.960 0.985 0.978 0.975 0.975 0.977 0.977 
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate, 1998-2013. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All 
regressions are weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 7. Divorce rate by duration of marriage and geography 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 1-2 years 3-10 years 11-19 years More than 20 years 
Unemployment rate 0.002*  0.008***  0.002  0.007***  
 (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  
Coastal region x Unemployment rate -0.003**  -0.013***  -0.009**  -0.012***  
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Male unemployment rate  0.001  0.008***  0.0004  0.007*** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate  -0.003*  -0.014***  -0.009**  -0.013*** 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Employment rate 0.919*** 0.0005 1.142** -0.001 -0.265 -0.003 0.258 -0.0002 
 (0.255) (0.001) (0.448) (0.003) (0.402) (0.003) (0.373) (0.003) 
Median age 0.129*** -0.040* 0.318*** -0.032 0.161*** 0.021 0.151*** 0.093** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) (0.037) 
Express divorce law x Time -0.012*** 0.125*** -0.032*** 0.307*** -0.018*** 0.170*** -0.020*** 0.139*** 
 (0.002) (0.022) (0.003) (0.043) (0.003) (0.039) (0.003) (0.042) 
Express divorce law x Time2 0.919*** -0.012*** 1.663 -0.032*** -0.265 -0.019*** 0.258 -0.019*** 
 (0.255) (0.002) (1.632) (0.003) (0.402) (0.003) (0.373) (0.003) 
Weather controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p-value (F-test of Coastal region x 
Unemployment rate + Unemployment rate=0) 0.1948 0.2402 0.1390 0.0809 0.0029 0.0010 0.0065 0.0137 
R2 0.961 0.961 0.979 0.979 0.976 0.977 0.979 0.980 
Observations 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 750 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate, 1998-2013. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All 
regressions are weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Climate controls included: Annual average precipitation, number of annual cloudless days, annual average temperature, number of days with 
temperatures greater than 25ºC, number of annual days with temperature lower than 0ºC.  
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Table 8. Marriage rate models, OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 
Unemployment rate -0.006 -0.050***     -0.034*** -0.030***     
 (0.007) (0.009)     (0.004) (0.006)     
Male unemployment rate   -0.023*** -0.062*** -0.067*** -0.033***   -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.032*** 
   (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)   (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Employment rate     -0.078*** -0.002     0.001 0.001 
     (0.012) (0.014)     (0.011) (0.012) 
Coastal region       1.424*** -3.893*** 1.638*** -3.640*** 1.636*** -6.864*** 
       (0.159) (0.701) (0.183) (0.803) (0.183) (2.230) 
Median age       0.554*** 0.427** 0.555*** 0.421** 0.559*** 0.421** 
       (0.138) (0.173) (0.140) (0.167) (0.138) (0.167) 
Express divorce law x Time       -0.348*** -0.731*** -0.317*** -0.678*** -0.319*** -0.679*** 
       (0.023) (0.122) (0.023) (0.117) (0.024) (0.119) 
Express divorce law x Time2       0.012*** 0.045*** 0.010*** 0.041*** 0.010*** 0.042*** 
       (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Regional fixed effects N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.002 0.181 0.038 0.318 0.251 0.251 0.963 0.981 0.963 0.981 0.963 0.981 
Observations 1450 800 1450 800 1450 800 1450 800 1450 800 1450 800 
Note: Endogenous variable: Marriage rate. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 9. Marriage rate and geography, OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 
Unemployment rate -0.035*** -0.037***     
 (0.008) (0.010)     
Coastal region x Unemployment rate 0.008 0.010     
 (0.009) (0.010)     
Male unemployment rate   -0.037*** -0.041*** -0.037*** -0.040*** 
   (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate   0.004 0.011 0.004 0.011 
   (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Employment rate     0.002 0.002 
     (0.012) (0.012) 
Median age 0.446** 0.410** 0.542*** 0.398** 0.547*** 0.399** 
 (0.200) (0.173) (0.135) (0.167) (0.130) (0.167) 
Express divorce law x Time -0.353*** -0.733*** -0.314*** -0.667*** -0.316*** -0.673*** 
 (0.033) (0.120) (0.024) (0.116) (0.024) (0.120) 
Express divorce law x Time2 0.019*** 0.047*** 0.010*** 0.042*** 0.010*** 0.042*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p-value (F-test of Coastal region x 
Unemployment rate + Unemployment rate=0) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0027 
R2 0.978 0.981 0.963 0.981 0.963 0.981 
Observations 1450 800 1450 800 1450 800 
Note: Endogenous variable: Marriage rate. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 10. Divorce rate models, lag specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unemployment rate 0.076***  -0.003  0.018***   
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)   
Unemployment rate t-1 -0.026***  -0.008*  -0.002   
 (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.004)   
Unemployment rate t-2 -0.070***  0.001  -0.002   
 (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)   
Coastal region x Unemployment rate t     -0.030***   
     (0.008)   
Coastal region x Unemployment rate t-1     -0.004   
     (0.005)   
Coastal region x Unemployment rate t-2     0.004   
     (0.006)   
Male unemployment rate  0.080***  -0.003  0.020*** 0.020*** 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005) (0.006) 
Male unemployment rate t-1  -0.021**  -0.008**  -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Male unemployment rate t-2  -0.063***  0.002  0.002 0.002 
  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate t      -0.032*** -0.032*** 
      (0.008) (0.008) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate t-1      -0.001 -0.001 
      (0.006) (0.006) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate t-2      -0.001 -0.001 
      (0.007) (0.007) 
Employment rate    0.004   -0.001 
    (0.008)   (0.007) 
Median age   -0.008 -0.007 0.047 0.058 0.058 
   (0.094) (0.094) (0.091) (0.093) (0.093) 
Express divorce law x Time   0.239*** 0.252*** 0.253*** 0.233*** 0.236*** 
   (0.059) (0.063) (0.075) (0.073) (0.076) 
Express divorce law x Time2   -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Weather controls N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional fixed effects N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 N N Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.231 0.214 0.983 0.984 0.985 0.985 0.985 
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 800 650 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are 
weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 11. Marriage rate models, lag specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 1985-2013 1998-2013 
Unemployment rate -0.081*** -0.110***     -0.031*** -0.028***     
 (0.007) (0.008)     (0.004) (0.005)     
Unemployment rate t-1 -0.016* -0.032***     -0.007 -0.006     
 (0.009) (0.006)     (0.004) (0.006)     
Unemployment rate t-2 0.116*** 0.128***     0.006 0.002     
 (0.008) (0.011)     (0.006) (0.008)     
Male unemployment rate   -0.091*** -0.102*** -0.095*** -0.102***   -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)   (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Male unemployment rate t-1   -0.013 -0.034*** -0.018* -0.034***   -0.008* -0.008 -0.008* -0.008 
   (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)   (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Male unemployment rate t-2   0.109*** 0.108*** 0.082*** 0.106***   0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 
   (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)   (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Employment rate     -0.051*** -0.004     0.001 -0.000 
     (0.012) (0.013)     (0.011) (0.012) 
Coastal region       1.419*** -3.640** 1.640*** -2.995* 1.638*** -2.991* 
       (0.167) (1.526) (0.198) (1.543) (0.199) (1.578) 
Median age       0.554*** 0.430** 0.555*** 0.419** 0.559*** 0.419** 
       (0.139) (0.174) (0.141) (0.168) (0.140) (0.168) 
Express divorce law x Time       -0.347*** -0.743*** -0.322*** -0.695*** -0.324*** -0.694*** 
       (0.032) (0.127) (0.027) (0.122) (0.026) (0.122) 
Express divorce law x Time2       0.012*** 0.047*** 0.010** 0.044*** 0.010** 0.044*** 
       (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Regional fixed effects N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.257 0.494 0.274 0.504 0.344 0.504 0.963 0.981 0.963 0.981 0.963 0.981 
Observations 1450 800 1450 800 1450 800 1450 800 1450 800 1450 800 
Note: Endogenous variable: Marriage rate. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Unemployment rate by region, 2010 
 
 
Figure A2. Marriage rate by region, 2010 
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Table A1. Divorce rate models, OLS estimates, 1998–2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unemployment rate 0.014  -0.011   
 (0.012)  (0.013)   
Male unemployment rate  0.053***  -0.015 -0.015 
  (0.009)  (0.013) (0.015) 
Employment rate     0.0004 
     (0.008) 
Coastal region   -5.601*** -5.165*** -1.728 
   (1.570) (1.556) (1.908) 
Median age   -0.291 -0.293 -0.293 
   (0.229) (0.230) (0.228) 
Express divorce law x Time   0.763*** 0.786*** 0.785*** 
   (0.148) (0.155) (0.155) 
Express divorce law x Time2   -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.053*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Regional fixed effects N N Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N Y Y Y 
Region x Time N N Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 N N Y Y Y 
R2 0.004 0.056 0.982 0.982 0.982 
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Divorce rate measured as annual number of divorces per 1,000 married individuals. All the models include a 
constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A2. Divorce rate and divorce law 
 
  
Before ‘express divorce’ law (1998-
2004) After ‘express divorce’ law (2005-2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Unemployment rate -0.011   -0.068** -0.068**     
 (0.009)   (0.032) (0.032)     
Male unemployment rate  -0.012 -0.010   -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
  (0.014) (0.014)   (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) 
Employment rate   0.009     0.018 0.018 
   (0.013)     (0.041) (0.041) 
Coastal region -2.400*** -2.497** -1.375 2.514 2.514 7.915 7.915 6.222 6.222 
 (0.808) (0.962) (1.659) (28.048) (28.048) (31.006) (31.006) (31.240) (31.240) 
Median age -0.386 -0.394 -0.374 -1.533 -1.533 -1.573 -1.573 -1.539 -1.539 
 (0.340) (0.343) (0.361) (1.274) (1.274) (1.332) (1.332) (1.330) (1.330) 
Express divorce law x Time     0.485***  0.571***  0.546*** 
     (0.122)  (0.143)  (0.144) 
Express divorce law x Time2     -0.001  -0.009  -0.007 
     (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.975 0.975 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 
Observations 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 
Note: Endogenous variable: Divorce rate measured as annual number of divorces per 1,000 married individuals. All the models include a 
constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A3. Divorce rate and geography 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unemployment rate 0.047***   -0.010  0.051***  
 (0.014)   (0.013)  (0.013)  
Coastal region x Unemployment rate -0.080***     -0.082***  
 (0.019)     (0.018)  
Male unemployment rate  0.046*** 0.042***  -0.014  0.045*** 
  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.013) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate  -0.078*** -0.079***    -0.082*** 
  (0.019) (0.019)    (0.018) 
Employment rate   -0.012  -.0001  -0.013 
   (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
Median age -0.157 -0.132 -0.136 -0.269 -0.271 -0.129 -0.111 
 (0.235) (0.236) (0.234) (0.223) (0.223) (0.229) (0.231) 
Express divorce law x Time 0.778*** 0.707*** 0.736*** 0.798*** 0.784*** 0.810*** 0.743*** 
 (0.163) (0.169) (0.174) (0.153) (0.148) (0.165) (0.167) 
Express divorce law x Time2 -0.062*** -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.066*** -0.062*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Weather controls N N N Y Y Y Y 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
p-value (F-test of Coastal region x 
Unemployment rate + Unemployment rate=0) 0.0499 0.0410 0.0520   0.0491 0.0389 
R2 0.984 0.984 0.984 0.982 0.982 0.984 0.984 
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Divorce rate measured as annual number of divorces per 1,000 married individuals, 1998-2013. All the models 
include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, 
** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A4. Marriage rate models, OLS estimates, 1998–2013 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment rate -0.110***   -0.060***   
 (0.017)   (0.013)   
Male unemployment rate  -0.134*** -0.175***  -0.063*** -0.063*** 
  (0.013) (0.017)  (0.015) (0.018) 
Employment rate   -0.096***   0.0002 
   (0.025)   (0.023) 
Average precipitation    -6.119*** -5.797*** -0.217 
    (1.552) (1.761) (2.289) 
Coastal region    0.444 0.433 0.433 
    (0.321) (0.317) (0.317) 
Median age    -1.099*** -0.996*** -0.996*** 
    (0.227) (0.223) (0.230) 
Express divorce law x Time    0.067*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Express divorce law x Time2 N N N Y Y Y 
 N N N Y Y Y 
Regional fixed effects N N N Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N N Y Y Y 
Region x Time 0.227 0.382 0.461 0.982 0.982 0.982 
Region x Time2 800 800 800 800 800 800 
R2 -0.110***   -0.060***   
Observations (0.017)   (0.013)   
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Marriage rate calculated as annual number of marriages per 
1,000 nonmarried individuals. All the models include a constant. Robust standard errors 
clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. *** Significant 




Table A5. Marriage rate and geography, OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  1998-2013 1998-2013 1998-2013 
Unemployment rate -0.072***   
 (0.018)   
Coastal region x Unemployment rate 0.017   
 (0.020)   
Male unemployment rate  -0.078*** -0.076*** 
  (0.020) (0.022) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate  0.019 0.019 
  (0.019) (0.020) 
Employment rate   0.003 
   (0.023) 
Median age 0.417 0.394 0.395 
 (0.319) (0.314) (0.315) 
Express divorce law x Time -1.101*** -0.977*** -0.985*** 
 (0.224) (0.220) (0.230) 
Express divorce law x Time2 0.069*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y 
p-value (F-test of Coastal region x Unemployment 
rate + Unemployment rate=0) 0.0007 0.0009 0.0047 
R2 0.982 0.982 0.982 
Observations 800 800 800 
 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Marriage rate calculated as annual number of marriages per 
1,000 nonmarried individuals, 1998–2013. All the models include a constant. Robust 
standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. 




Table A6. Divorce rate models, lag specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Unemployment rate 0.180***  -0.004  0.050***   
 (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)   
Unemployment rate t-1 -0.061***  -0.017*  0.001   
 (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.010)   
Unemployment rate t-2 -0.162***  -0.000  -0.002   
 (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.016)   
Coastal region x Unemployment rate t     -0.075***   
     (0.019)   
Coastal region x Unemployment rate t-1     -0.015   
     (0.012)   
Coastal region x Unemployment rate t-2     0.003   
     (0.014)   
Male unemployment rate  0.190***  -0.006  0.052*** 0.047*** 
  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.012) (0.013) 
Male unemployment rate t-1  -0.053***  -0.024**  -0.007 -0.008 
  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.012) (0.012) 
Male unemployment rate t-2  -0.144***  0.003  0.010 0.009 
  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.018) (0.017) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate t      -0.078*** -0.079*** 
      (0.020) (0.020) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate t-1      -0.009 -0.008 
      (0.013) (0.013) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate t-2      -0.010 -0.010 
      (0.015) (0.015) 
Employment rate    -0.002   -0.013 
    (0.020)   (0.018) 
Median age   -0.273 -0.270 -0.130 -0.102 -0.108 
   (0.230) (0.230) (0.224) (0.229) (0.225) 
Express divorce law x Time   0.716*** 0.738*** 0.770*** 0.709*** 0.740*** 
   (0.147) (0.153) (0.180) (0.176) (0.177) 
Express divorce law x Time2   -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.061*** 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Weather controls N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Regional fixed effects N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 N N Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.228 0.214 0.982 0.982 0.984 0.984 0.984 
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Divorce rate measured as annual number of divorces per 1,000 married individuals, 1998-2013. All the models 
include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. *** Significant at the 1% level, 
** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
 50
Table A7. Marriage rate models, lag specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unemployment rate -0.219***  -0.054***   
 (0.014)  (0.012)   
Unemployment rate t-1 -0.069***  -0.016   
 (0.011)  (0.011)   
Unemployment rate t-2 0.244***  0.000   
 (0.019)  (0.015)   
Male unemployment rate  -0.200***  -0.057*** -0.058*** 
  (0.012)  (0.014) (0.016) 
Male unemployment rate t-1  -0.070***  -0.017 -0.017 
  (0.015)  (0.011) (0.012) 
Male unemployment rate t-2  0.196***  -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.023)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Employment rate     -0.003 
     (0.024) 
Coastal region   -4.818 -3.534 -3.497 
   (2.889) (3.065) (3.139) 
Median age   0.438 0.419 0.418 
   (0.322) (0.318) (0.319) 
Express divorce law x Time   -1.142*** -1.046*** -1.040*** 
   (0.232) (0.227) (0.231) 
Express divorce law x Time2   0.072*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
   (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Regional fixed effects N N Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N Y Y Y 
Region x Time N N Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 N N Y Y Y 
R2 0.507 0.531 0.982 0.982 0.982 
Observations 800 800 800 800 800 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Marriage rate calculated as annual number of marriages per 
1,000 non-married individuals, 1998–2013. All the models include a constant. Robust 
standard errors clustered by region. All regressions are weighted by region population. 
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% 
level. 
 Table A8. Quantile regression estimates, divorce rate model 
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Coastal region -16.757*** -17.823*** -19.102*** -18.423*** -11.386 -13.058* -11.700* -10.799 -8.926*** 
 (5.989) (5.189) (6.548) (6.388) (6.921) (7.374) (7.035) (6.652) (3.272) 
Median age -0.177*** -0.131** -0.085 -0.047 -0.046 0.023 0.083 0.107 0.105*** 
 (0.063) (0.055) (0.069) (0.067) (0.073) (0.078) (0.074) (0.070) (0.034) 
Express divorce law x Time -0.573 -0.183 -0.193 0.011 0.667 0.769 0.934 0.915 0.672** 
 (0.596) (0.516) (0.651) (0.635) (0.688) (0.733) (0.700) (0.662) (0.325) 
Express divorce law x Time2 0.015 -0.004 -0.003 -0.012 -0.039 -0.044 -0.051* -0.051* -0.042*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.014) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate (1998–2013). Estimates weighted by region population. The model includes a constant. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
 Table A9. Quantile regression estimates, divorce rate model 
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Male unemployment rate -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
Employment rate 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.010*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) 
Coastal region -15.979*** -18.225*** -19.354*** -18.801*** -11.753 -12.778* -12.330* -11.261* -10.923*** 
 (5.941) (5.220) (6.301) (6.416) (7.136) (7.476) (6.913) (6.611) (3.226) 
Median age -0.130** -0.079 -0.076 -0.065 -0.044 0.018 0.070 0.080 0.123*** 
 (0.062) (0.055) (0.066) (0.067) (0.075) (0.079) (0.073) (0.069) (0.034) 
Express divorce law x Time -0.264 -0.215 -0.395 -0.087 0.658 0.803 1.003 0.835 0.696** 
 (0.592) (0.520) (0.628) (0.639) (0.711) (0.745) (0.689) (0.659) (0.322) 
Express divorce law x Time2 0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.007 -0.038 -0.046 -0.054* -0.048* -0.045*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.014) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate (1998–2013). Estimates weighted by region population. The model includes a constant. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 Table A10. Quantile regression estimates, marriage rate model 
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Unemployment rate -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.038*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Coastal region -16.030*** -12.927** -12.839 -10.153 -8.650 -9.242 -5.687 -4.710 -0.953 
 (4.287) (5.565) (8.062) (9.984) (9.357) (9.223) (8.504) (8.775) (4.658) 
Median age 0.724*** 0.715*** 0.725*** 0.596*** 0.627*** 0.612*** 0.554*** 0.608*** 0.598*** 
 (0.045) (0.059) (0.085) (0.105) (0.098) (0.097) (0.089) (0.092) (0.049) 
Express divorce law x Time -1.221*** -2.091*** -1.573* -2.736*** -2.970*** -1.460 -1.518* -0.633 -1.358*** 
 (0.426) (0.553) (0.802) (0.993) (0.931) (0.917) (0.846) (0.873) (0.463) 
Express divorce law x Time2 0.050*** 0.086*** 0.063* 0.113*** 0.120*** 0.058 0.061* 0.023 0.052*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.034) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.020) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Marriage rate (1998–2013). Estimates weighted by region population. The model includes a constant. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 Table A11. Quantile regression estimates, marriage rate model 
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Male unemployment rate -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.035*** -0.047*** -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.041*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
Employment rate 0.009** 0.007 0.003 -0.014 -0.013 -0.011 -0.007 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) 
Coastal region -7.508* -8.600 -10.544 -8.691 -5.954 -3.861 -1.349 -1.304 2.592 
 (3.953) (5.824) (9.096) (9.509) (8.514) (8.910) (8.857) (8.811) (4.857) 
Median age 0.692*** 0.721*** 0.724*** 0.541*** 0.582*** 0.532*** 0.578*** 0.584*** 0.648*** 
 (0.042) (0.061) (0.096) (0.100) (0.089) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.051) 
Express divorce law x Time -1.690*** -2.103*** -1.106 -1.274 -2.461*** -1.716* -1.337 -0.764 -1.559*** 
 (0.394) (0.581) (0.907) (0.948) (0.849) (0.888) (0.883) (0.878) (0.484) 
Express divorce law x Time2 0.071*** 0.087*** 0.043 0.049 0.097*** 0.069* 0.051 0.028 0.062*** 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.021) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Marriage rate (1998–2013). Estimates weighted by region population. The model includes a constant. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 Table A12. Quantile regression estimates, divorce rate model 
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Unemployment rate 0.014*** 0.008* 0.009* 0.011** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Coastal region x Unemployment rate -0.026*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.020*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Median age -0.192*** -0.146** -0.036 -0.003 0.027 0.090 0.095 0.091 0.162*** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.067) (0.063) (0.075) (0.072) (0.060) (0.072) (0.037) 
Express divorce law x Time -0.260 -0.041 0.293 0.112 0.355 0.474 1.106* 0.760 0.848** 
 (0.535) (0.548) (0.628) (0.595) (0.703) (0.672) (0.568) (0.674) (0.349) 
Express divorce law x Time2 -0.001 -0.011 -0.026 -0.018 -0.029 -0.035 -0.061** -0.045 -0.053*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.015) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate (1998–2013). Estimates weighted by region population. The model includes a constant. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
  Table A13. Quantile regression estimates, divorce rate model 
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Male unemployment rate 0.011*** 0.011** 0.010* 0.010* 0.008 0.014** 0.011** 0.009 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
Coastal region x Male unemployment rate -0.026*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) 
Employment rate -0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.000 -0.008 -0.005 -0.012** -0.010 -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
Median age -0.137*** -0.111* -0.061 -0.023 0.045 0.075 0.098* 0.083 0.095** 
 (0.053) (0.061) (0.067) (0.067) (0.075) (0.068) (0.058) (0.073) (0.038) 
Express divorce law x Time -0.097 -0.092 0.281 0.150 0.431 0.428 1.304** 1.031 0.868** 
 (0.497) (0.574) (0.631) (0.628) (0.702) (0.642) (0.542) (0.690) (0.353) 
Express divorce law x Time2 -0.007 -0.010 -0.026 -0.019 -0.033 -0.034 -0.070*** -0.059** -0.055*** 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.023) (0.030) (0.015) 
Regional fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region x Time2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Note: Endogenous variable: Crude divorce rate (1998–2013). Estimates weighted by region population. The model includes a constant. *** 









2011/1, Oppedisano, V; Turati, G.: "What are the causes of educational inequalities and of their evolution over time 
in Europe? Evidence from PISA" 
2011/2, Dahlberg, M; Edmark, K; Lundqvist, H.: "Ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution" 
2011/3, Canova, L.; Vaglio, A.: "Why do educated mothers matter? A model of parental help” 
2011/4, Delgado, F.J.; Lago-Peñas, S.; Mayor, M.: “On the determinants of local tax rates: new evidence from 
Spain” 
2011/5, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: “A model of music piracy with popularity-dependent copying costs” 
2011/6, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.; Parellada, M.: “Universities and regional economic growth in Spanish 
regions” 
2011/7, Duch, N.; García-Estévez, J.: “Do universities affect firms’ location decisions? Evidence from Spain” 
2011/8, Dahlberg, M.; Mörk, E.: “Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from 
election year effects” 
2011/9, Costas-Pérez, E.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: “Corruption scandals, press reporting, and 
accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors” 
2011/10, Choi, A.; Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: “Hell to touch the sky? Private tutoring and academic achievement 
in Korea” 
2011/11, Mira Godinho, M.; Cartaxo, R.: “University patenting, licensing and technology transfer: how 
organizational context and available resources determine performance” 
2011/12, Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.; Montolio, D.: “The link between public support and private R&D 
effort: What is the optimal subsidy?” 
2011/13, Breuillé, M.L.; Duran-Vigneron, P.; Samson, A.L.: “To assemble to resemble? A study of tax disparities 
among French municipalities” 
2011/14, McCann, P.; Ortega-Argilés, R.: “Smart specialisation, regional growth and applications to EU cohesion 
policy” 
2011/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.: “Regulatory federalism and industrial policy in broadband telecommunications” 
2011/16, Pelegrín, A.; Bolancé, C.: “Offshoring and company characteristics: some evidence from the analysis of 
Spanish firm data” 
2011/17, Lin, C.: “Give me your wired and your highly skilled: measuring the impact of immigration policy on 
employers and shareholders”  
2011/18, Bianchini, L.; Revelli, F.: “Green polities: urban environmental performance and government popularity” 
2011/19, López Real, J.: “Family reunification or point-based immigration system? The case of the U.S. and 
Mexico” 
2011/20, Bogliacino, F.; Piva, M.; Vivarelli, M.: “The impact of R&D on employment in Europe: a firm-level 
analysis” 
2011/21, Tonello, M.: “Mechanisms of peer interactions between native and non-native students: rejection or 
integration?” 
2011/22, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Montolio, D.: “What type of innovative firms acquire knowledge 
intensive services and from which suppliers?” 
2011/23, Banal-Estañol, A.; Macho-Stadler, I.; Pérez-Castrillo, D.: “Research output from university-industry 
collaborative projects” 
2011/24, Ligthart, J.E.; Van Oudheusden, P.: “In government we trust: the role of fiscal decentralization” 
2011/25, Mongrain, S.; Wilson, J.D.: “Tax competition with heterogeneous capital mobility” 
2011/26, Caruso, R.; Costa, J.; Ricciuti, R.: “The probability of military rule in Africa, 1970-2007” 
2011/27, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Local spending and the housing boom” 
2011/28, Simón, H.; Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.: “Occupational mobility of immigrants in a low skilled economy. The 
Spanish case” 
2011/29, Piolatto, A.; Trotin, G.: “Optimal tax enforcement under prospect theory” 
2011/30, Montolio, D; Piolatto, A.: “Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns” 
2011/31, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Vivarelli, M.: “The determinants of YICs’ R&D activity” 
2011/32, Goodspeed, T.J.: “Corruption, accountability, and decentralization: theory and evidence from Mexico” 
2011/33, Pedraja, F.; Cordero, J.M.: “Analysis of alternative proposals to reform the Spanish intergovernmental 
transfer system for municipalities” 
2011/34, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Welfare spending and ethnic 
heterogeneity: evidence from a massive immigration wave” 
2011/35, Lyytikäinen, T.: “Tax competition among local governments: evidence from a property tax reform in 
Finland” 
2011/36, Brülhart, M.; Schmidheiny, K.: “Estimating the Rivalness of State-Level Inward FDI” 
2011/37, García-Pérez, J.I.; Hidalgo-Hidalgo, M.; Robles-Zurita, J.A.: “Does grade retention affect achievement? 
Some evidence from Pisa” 
2011/38, Boffa, f.; Panzar. J.: “Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative” 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2011/39, González-Val, R.; Olmo, J.: “Growth in a cross-section of cities: location, increasing returns or random 
growth?” 
2011/40, Anesi, V.; De Donder, P.: “Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression” 
2011/41, Di Pietro, G.; Mora, T.: “The effect of the l’Aquila earthquake on labour market outcomes” 
2011/42, Brueckner, J.K.; Neumark, D.: “Beaches, sunshine, and public-sector pay: theory and evidence on 
amenities and rent extraction by government workers” 
2011/43, Cortés, D.: “Decentralization of government and contracting with the private sector” 
2011/44, Turati, G.; Montolio, D.; Piacenza, M.: “Fiscal decentralisation, private school funding, and students’ 





2012/1, Montolio, D.; Trujillo, E.: "What drives investment in telecommunications? The role of regulation, firms’ 
internationalization and market knowledge" 
2012/2, Giesen, K.; Suedekum, J.: "The size distribution across all “cities”: a unifying approach" 
2012/3, Foremny, D.; Riedel, N.: "Business taxes and the electoral cycle" 
2012/4, García-Estévez, J.; Duch-Brown, N.: "Student graduation: to what extent does university expenditure 
matter?" 
2012/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in 
tax enforcement" 
2012/6, Pickering, A.C.; Rockey, J.: "Ideology and the growth of US state government" 
2012/7, Vergolini, L.; Zanini, N.: "How does aid matter? The effect of financial aid on university enrolment 
decisions" 
2012/8, Backus, P.: "Gibrat’s law and legacy for non-profit organisations: a non-parametric analysis" 
2012/9, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Marín-López, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "What underlies localization and 
urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms" 
2012/10, Mantovani, A.; Vandekerckhove, J.: "The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in 
complementary markets" 
2012/11, Garcia-López, M.A.: "Urban spatial structure, suburbanization and transportation in Barcelona" 
2012/12, Revelli, F.: "Business taxation and economic performance in hierarchical government structures" 
2012/13, Arqué-Castells, P.; Mohnen, P.: "Sunk costs, extensive R&D subsidies and permanent inducement 
effects" 
2012/14, Boffa, F.; Piolatto, A.; Ponzetto, G.: "Centralization and accountability: theory and evidence from the 
Clean Air Act" 
2012/15, Cheshire, P.C.; Hilber, C.A.L.; Kaplanis, I.: "Land use regulation and productivity – land matters: 
evidence from a UK supermarket chain" 
2012/16, Choi, A.; Calero, J.: "The contribution of the disabled to the attainment of the Europe 2020 strategy 
headline targets" 
2012/17, Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "The ins and outs of unemployment in a two-tier labor market" 
2012/18, González-Val, R.; Lanaspa, L.; Sanz, F.: "New evidence on Gibrat’s law for cities" 
2012/19, Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Job search methods in times of crisis: native and immigrant strategies in Spain" 
2012/20, Lessmann, C.: "Regional inequality and decentralization – an empirical analysis" 
2012/21, Nuevo-Chiquero, A.: "Trends in shotgun marriages: the pill, the will or the cost?" 
2012/22, Piil Damm, A.: "Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: evidence from quasi-random 
neighborhood assignment of immigrants" 
2012/23, Ploeckl, F.: "Space, settlements, towns: the influence of geography and market access on settlement 
distribution and urbanization" 
2012/24, Algan, Y.; Hémet, C.; Laitin, D.: "Diversity and local public goods: a natural experiment with exogenous 
residential allocation" 
2012/25, Martinez, D.; Sjögren, T.: "Vertical externalities with lump-sum taxes: how much difference does 
unemployment make?" 
2012/26, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "The effect of within-group inequality in a conflict against a unitary threat" 
2012/27, Andini, M.; De Blasio, G.; Duranton, G.; Strange, W.C.: "Marshallian labor market pooling: evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/28, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do political parties matter for local land use policies?" 
2012/29, Buonanno, P.; Durante, R.; Prarolo, G.; Vanin, P.: "Poor institutions, rich mines: resource curse and the 
origins of the Sicilian mafia" 
2012/30, Anghel, B.; Cabrales, A.; Carro, J.M.: "Evaluating a bilingual education program in Spain: the impact 
beyond foreign language learning" 
2012/31, Curto-Grau, M.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers 
& state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2012/32, Kappeler, A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Stephan, A.; Välilä, T.: "Does fiscal decentralization foster regional 
investment in productive infrastructure?" 
2012/33, Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: "Single vs double ballot and party coalitions: the impact on fiscal policy. Evidence 
from Italy" 
2012/34, Ramachandran, R.: "Language use in education and primary schooling attainment: evidence from a 
natural experiment in Ethiopia" 
2012/35, Rothstein, J.: "Teacher quality policy when supply matters" 
2012/36, Ahlfeldt, G.M.: "The hidden dimensions of urbanity" 
2012/37, Mora, T.; Gil, J.; Sicras-Mainar, A.: "The influence of BMI, obesity and overweight on medical costs: a 
panel data approach" 
2012/38, Pelegrín, A.; García-Quevedo, J.: "Which firms are involved in foreign vertical integration?" 
2012/39, Agasisti, T.; Longobardi, S.: "Inequality in education: can Italian disadvantaged students close the gap? A 





2013/1, Sánchez-Vidal, M.; González-Val, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Sequential city growth in the US: does age 
matter?" 
2013/2, Hortas Rico, M.: "Sprawl, blight and the role of urban containment policies. Evidence from US cities" 
2013/3, Lampón, J.F.; Cabanelas-Lorenzo, P-; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Why firms relocate their production overseas? 
The answer lies inside: corporate, logistic and technological determinants" 
2013/4, Montolio, D.; Planells, S.: "Does tourism boost criminal activity? Evidence from a top touristic country" 
2013/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Holl, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Suburbanization and highways: when the Romans, 
the Bourbons and the first cars still shape Spanish cities" 
2013/6, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Montolio, D.: "Should large Spanish municipalities be financially compensated? 
Costs and benefits of being a capital/central municipality" 
2013/7, Escardíbul, J.O.; Mora, T.: "Teacher gender and student performance in mathematics. Evidence from 
Catalonia" 
2013/8, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Banking towards development: evidence from the Spanish 
banking expansion plan" 
2013/9, Asensio, J.; Gómez-Lobo, A.; Matas, A.: "How effective are policies to reduce gasoline consumption? 
Evaluating a quasi-natural experiment in Spain" 
2013/10, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "The effects of unemployment benefits on migration in lagging regions" 
2013/11, Segarra, A.; García-Quevedo, J.; Teruel, M.: "Financial constraints and the failure of innovation 
projects" 
2013/12, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.: "The mathematics skills of school children: How does England compare to the high 
performing East Asian jurisdictions?" 
2013/13, González-Val, R.; Tirado-Fabregat, D.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Market potential and city growth: 
Spain 1860-1960" 
2013/14, Lundqvist, H.: "Is it worth it? On the returns to holding political office" 
2013/15, Ahlfeldt, G.M.; Maennig, W.: "Homevoters vs. leasevoters: a spatial analysis of airport effects" 
2013/16, Lampón, J.F.; Lago-Peñas, S.: "Factors behind international relocation and changes in production 
geography in the European automobile components industry" 
2013/17, Guío, J.M.; Choi, A.: "Evolution of the school failure risk during the 2000 decade in Spain: analysis of 
Pisa results with a two-level logistic mode" 
2013/18, Dahlby, B.; Rodden, J.: "A political economy model of the vertical fiscal gap and vertical fiscal 
imbalances in a federation" 
2013/19, Acacia, F.; Cubel, M.: "Strategic voting and happiness" 
2013/20, Hellerstein, J.K.; Kutzbach, M.J.; Neumark, D.: "Do labor market networks have an important spatial 
dimension?" 
2013/21, Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Is money all? Financing versus knowledge and demand constraints to 
innovation" 
2013/22, Lin, J.: "Regional resilience" 
2013/23, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: "R&D drivers and obstacles to innovation in 
the energy industry" 
2013/24, Huisman, R.; Stradnic, V.; Westgaard, S.: "Renewable energy and electricity prices: indirect empirical 
evidence from hydro power" 
2013/25, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/26, Lambertini, L.; Mantovani, A.: "Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-
emption, voracity and exhaustion" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2013/27, Feld, L.P.; Kalb, A.; Moessinger, M.D.; Osterloh, S.: "Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules 
and no-bailout clauses – the Swiss experience" 
2013/28, Hilber, C.A.L.; Vermeulen, W.: "The impact of supply constraints on house prices in England" 
2013/29, Revelli, F.: "Tax limits and local democracy" 
2013/30, Wang, R.; Wang, W.: "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization" 
2013/31, Dargaud, E.; Mantovani, A.; Reggiani, C.: "The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective" 
2013/32, Saarimaa, T.; Tukiainen, J.: "Local representation and strategic voting: evidence from electoral boundary 
reforms" 
2013/33, Agasisti, T.; Murtinu, S.: "Are we wasting public money? No! The effects of grants on Italian university 
students’ performances" 
2013/34, Flacher, D.; Harari-Kermadec, H.; Moulin, L.: "Financing higher education: a contributory scheme" 
2013/35, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: "Sending the pork home: birth town bias in transfers to Italian municipalities" 
2013/36, Coad, A.; Frankish, J.S.; Roberts, R.G.; Storey, D.J.: "New venture survival and growth: Does the fog 
lift?" 
2013/37, Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Waterson, M.: "Revenues from storage in a competitive electricity market: 





2014/1, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "When police patrols matter. The effect of police proximity on citizens’ 
crime risk perception" 
2014/2, Garcia-López, M.A.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Do land use policies follow road 
construction?" 
2014/3, Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: "Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle" 
2014/4, Cuberes, D.; González-Val, R.: "The effect of the Spanish Reconquest on Iberian Cities" 
2014/5, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, E.: "Tax professionals' view of the Spanish tax system: efficiency, 
equity and tax planning" 
2014/6, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Difference-form group contests" 
2014/7, Del Rey, E.; Racionero, M.: "Choosing the type of income-contingent loan: risk-sharing versus risk-
pooling" 
2014/8, Torregrosa Hetland, S.: "A fiscal revolution? Progressivity in the Spanish tax system, 1960-1990" 
2014/9, Piolatto, A.: "Itemised deductions: a device to reduce tax evasion" 
2014/10, Costa, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Segarra, A.: "Energy efficiency determinants: an empirical analysis of 
Spanish innovative firms" 
2014/11, García-Quevedo, J.; Pellegrino, G.; Savona, M.: "Reviving demand-pull perspectives: the effect of 
demand uncertainty and stagnancy on R&D strategy" 
2014/12, Calero, J.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Barriers to non-formal professional training in Spain in periods of economic 
growth and crisis. An analysis with special attention to the effect of the previous human capital of workers" 
2014/13, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "Gender differences and stereotypes in the beauty" 
2014/14, Piolatto, A.; Schuett, F.: "Media competition and electoral politics" 
2014/15, Montolio, D.; Trillas, F.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Regulatory environment and firm performance in EU 
telecommunications services" 
2014/16, Lopez-Rodriguez, J.; Martinez, D.: "Beyond the R&D effects on innovation: the contribution of non-
R&D activities to TFP growth in the EU" 
2014/17, González-Val, R.: "Cross-sectional growth in US cities from 1990 to 2000" 
2014/18, Vona, F.; Nicolli, F.: "Energy market liberalization and renewable energy policies in OECD countries" 
2014/19, Curto-Grau, M.: "Voters’ responsiveness to public employment policies" 
2014/20, Duro, J.A.; Teixidó-Figueras, J.; Padilla, E.: "The causal factors of international inequality in co2 
emissions per capita: a regression-based inequality decomposition analysis" 
2014/21, Fleten, S.E.; Huisman, R.; Kilic, M.; Pennings, E.; Westgaard, S.: "Electricity futures prices: time 
varying sensitivity to fundamentals" 
2014/22, Afcha, S.; García-Quevedo, J,: "The impact of R&D subsidies on R&D employment composition" 
2014/23, Mir-Artigues, P.; del Río, P.: "Combining tariffs, investment subsidies and soft loans in a renewable 
electricity deployment policy" 
2014/24, Romero-Jordán, D.; del Río, P.; Peñasco, C.: "Household electricity demand in Spanish regions. Public 
policy implications" 
2014/25, Salinas, P.: "The effect of decentralization on educational outcomes: real autonomy matters!" 
2014/26, Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "Does corruption erode trust in government? Evidence from a recent 
surge of local scandals in Spain" 
2014/27, Costas-Pérez, E.: "Political corruption and voter turnout: mobilization or disaffection?" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2014/28, Cubel, M.; Nuevo-Chiquero, A.; Sanchez-Pages, S.; Vidal-Fernandez, M.: "Do personality traits affect 
productivity? Evidence from the LAB" 
2014/29, Teresa Costa, M.T.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Retail price effects of feed-in tariff regulation" 
2014/30, Kilic, M.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "The stabilizing effect of hydro reservoir levels on intraday power prices 
under wind forecast errors" 
2014/31, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.: "The diffusion of patented oil and gas technology with 
environmental uses: a forward patent citation analysis" 
2014/32, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: "Public-private sector wage differentials by type of contract: 
evidence from Spain" 
2014/33, Backus, P.; Esteller-Moré, A.: "Is income redistribution a form of insurance, a public good or both?" 
2014/34, Huisman, R.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Costs of power supply flexibility: the indirect impact of a Spanish 
policy change" 
2014/35, Jerrim, J.; Choi, A.; Simancas Rodríguez, R.: "Two-sample two-stage least squares (TSTSLS) estimates 
of earnings mobility: how consistent are they?" 
2014/36, Mantovani, A.;  Tarola, O.; Vergari, C.: "Hedonic quality, social norms, and environmental campaigns" 
2014/37, Ferraresi, M.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Local infrastructures and externalities: Does the size matter?" 





2015/1, Foremny, D.; Freier, R.; Moessinger, M-D.; Yeter, M.: "Overlapping political budget cycles in the 
legislative and the executive" 
2015/2, Colombo, L.; Galmarini, U.: "Optimality and distortionary lobbying: regulating tobacco consumption" 
2015/3, Pellegrino, G.: "Barriers to innovation: Can firm age help lower them?" 
2015/4, Hémet, C.: "Diversity and employment prospects: neighbors matter!" 
2015/5, Cubel, M.; Sanchez-Pages, S.: "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions" 
2015/6, Choi, A.; Jerrim, J.: "The use (and misuse) of Pisa in guiding policy reform: the case of Spain" 
2015/7, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Salvadori, L.: "Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between 
sub-central administrations" 
2015/8, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Analysing the sensitivity of electricity system operational costs 
to deviations in supply and demand" 
2015/9, Salvadori, L.: "Does tax enforcement counteract the negative effects of terrorism? A case study of the 
Basque Country" 
2015/10, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "How time shapes crime: the temporal impacts of football matches on 
crime" 
2015/11, Piolatto, A.: "Online booking and information: competition and welfare consequences of review 
aggregators" 
2015/12, Boffa, F.; Pingali, V.; Sala, F.: "Strategic investment in merchant transmission: the impact of capacity 
utilization rules" 
2015/13, Slemrod, J.: "Tax administration and tax systems" 
2015/14, Arqué-Castells, P.; Cartaxo, R.M.; García-Quevedo, J.; Mira Godinho, M.: "How inventor royalty 
shares affect patenting and income in Portugal and Spain" 
2015/15, Montolio, D.; Planells-Struse, S.: "Measuring the negative externalities of a private leisure activity: 
hooligans and pickpockets around the stadium" 
2015/16, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Costa-Campi, M.T.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Unexpected consequences of 
liberalisation: metering, losses, load profiles and cost settlement in Spain’s electricity system" 
2015/17, Batalla-Bejerano, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Impacts of intermittent renewable generation on electricity 
system costs" 
2015/18, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Paniagua, J.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "Are energy market integrations a green light for 
FDI?" 
2015/19, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Sánchez-Vidal, M.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Big plant closures and agglomeration 
economies" 
2015/20, Garcia-López, M.A.; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "How does transportation shape 
intrametropolitan growth? An answer from the regional express rail" 
2015/21, Esteller-Moré, A.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Fiscal equalization under political pressures" 
2015/22, Escardíbul, J.O.; Afcha, S.: "Determinants of doctorate holders’ job satisfaction. An analysis by 
employment sector and type of satisfaction in Spain" 
2015/23, Aidt, T.; Asatryan, Z.; Badalyan, L.; Heinemann, F.: "Vote buying or (political) business (cycles) as 
usual?" 
2015/24, Albæk, K.: "A test of the ‘lose it or use it’ hypothesis in labour markets around the world" 
2015/25, Angelucci, C.; Russo, A.: "Petty corruption and citizen feedback" 
  
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2015/26, Moriconi, S.; Picard, P.M.; Zanaj, S.: "Commodity taxation and regulatory competition" 
2015/27, Brekke, K.R.; Garcia Pires, A.J.; Schindler, D.; Schjelderup, G.: "Capital taxation and imperfect 
competition: ACE vs. CBIT" 
2015/28, Redonda, A.: "Market structure, the functional form of demand and the sensitivity of the vertical reaction 
function" 
2015/29, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: "An analysis of wage differentials between full-and part-time 
workers in Spain" 
2015/30, Garcia-López, M.A.; Pasidis, I.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Express delivery to the suburbs the effects of 
transportation in Europe’s heterogeneous cities" 
2015/31, Torregrosa, S.: "Bypassing progressive taxation: fraud and base erosion in the Spanish income tax (1970-
2001)" 
2015/32, Choi, H.; Choi, A.: "When one door closes: the impact of the hagwon curfew on the consumption of 
private tutoring in the republic of Korea" 
2015/33, Escardíbul, J.O.; Helmy, N.: "Decentralisation and school autonomy impact on the quality of education: 
the case of two MENA countries" 
2015/34, González-Val, R.; Marcén, M.: "Divorce and the business cycle: a cross-country analysis" 
2015/35, Calero, J.; Choi, A.: "The distribution of skills among the European adult population and unemployment: a 
comparative approach" 
2015/36, Mediavilla, M.; Zancajo, A.: "Is there real freedom of school choice? An analysis from Chile" 
2015/37, Daniele, G.: "Strike one to educate one hundred: organized crime, political selection and politicians’ 
ability" 
 

